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PROHIBITION SEARCHES BY NEW YORK STATE POLICE
The familiar doctrine of the federal courts which bars the use
of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search has figured
prominently in prosecutions under the National Prohibition Act.
Defendants have not been slow to discover the value of the timely
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motion to suppress evidence 1 as a method of halting, in flinize,
the cases against them nor, when seeking the reversal of a con-
viction, have they been unaware of the efficacy of an appeal to
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, case.%
involving an interpretation of the so-called "federal rule" have
multiplied. But the decisions have too frequently turned upon
technicalities. Consequently, lest the champions of a glorified
rule of evidence completely thwart the efforts of the govern-
ment to enforce its liquor laws, courts have found it necessary
to give increasing scope to certain recognized exceptions to the
rule.2
One of the most important of these exceptions has been the
stipulation that the federal rule does not operate to exclude
evidence produced by state officers, even though the search may
have been unreasonable. This limitation is, obviously, but an
application of the long accepted view that the first ten amend-
ments of the United States Constitution are restrictive only of
acts by the federal government.2 But the stipulation has never-
theless been utilized as an avenue of escape from the apparent
inadequacy of federal courts to cope with so complex a police
measure as the Prohibition Act. The number of prosecutions
based upon searches by state officers has rapidly increased and
it is now the admitted policy, of the federal authorities to rely
wherever possible upon the activity of the local peace officers
for the arrest and prosecution of the typical bootlegger and in-
land runnrunner.4
While it is undoubtedly true that one reason for the adoption
of this policy has been the desire to throw as many Prohibition
cases as possible into the state courts because those courts are
more easily adapted to the enforcement of police regulations,
it is equally true that the federal authorities have understood
the advantage of basing a case even in a United States court
upon a search beyond the condemning reach of the federal rule.
That this latter motive has been influential is suggested by the
fact that in New York, although the state enforcement has been
repealed, the United States attorneys have quite generally based
their prosecutions upon evidence secured by local police. Indeed,
it has been said that, because of the rigidly narrow grounds upon
which a federal search will be declared reasonable, the activity
of the state officers is indispensable.5
1 The requirement of a motion prior to trial originated with Weels v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
2 See Comment (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 536.
3 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833) ; Twining v. United States,
211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
4 See Comment (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURN.iL 988, for a report of the
actual, practices of federal officials.
5 Supra note 4.
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In the face of this situation comes the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Gambino v. United States, 48 Sup.
Ct. 139 (U. S. 1927), declaring a liquor search by a state trooper
in New York to be a search by a "federal officer," and therefore
subject to every scrutiny now required under the federal rule.
The search in question was made in the defendant's automobile
which was stopped at a wayside garage in the northern part of
the state. No federal agent was present, nor was there evidence
of any cooperation between the federal and state authorities con-
cerning this specific search. But Mr. Justice Brandeis, who
wrote the opinion in the case, argues that since the Mullan-Gage
law (the state enforcement act) had been repealed, the state
troopers must have known that they were acting solely to en-
force a federal law. The learned Justice also attaches signifi-
cance to certain memoranda issued by the Governor of the state
at the time the Mullan-Gage law wag repealed, urging the state
police to continue their aid in the enforcement of the national
act; and to certain conferences held between state and federal
enforcement agencies at Albany in 1924. The conduct of the
state troopers in turning over the evidence to the federal authori-
ties immediately after the arrest of the defendants is thought to
be particularly damaging to the searchers' status as local officers.
The court admits that a state trooper cannot be brought within
the enabling clauses of the National Prohibition Act and thus
clothed with an express "agency" from the federal government,
but it concludes that the prosecution in a United States district
court was "in effect a ratification of the arrest, search and sei-
zure made by the troopers on behalf of the United States." Hav-
ing thus raised the difficult question of "agency," the court never-
theless feels that it has "no occasion to inquire" whether, in spite
of the repeal of the Mullan-Gage law, other statutes of the state
of New York might have imposed the duty to search in this
particular case.
The significance of the Gambino case can be appreciated only
after a consideration of the decisions dealing with searches by
state officers that were to be found in the reports at the time the
case was before the Supreme Court. Some months prior to the
date of the Gambino case, the Supreme Court had promulgated
its condemnation of a search initiated by the state authorities,
but consummated in part by federal agents.8 In the Byars case,
however, the controlling factor was the actual participation of
the federal agent in the search, and, although some of the court's
language in that cas8 ould seem to indicate a growing unfriend-
6Act, June 1, 1923, c. 871; N. Y. Laws 1923, 1690.
7 Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530, 47 Sup. Ct. 191 (1926).
8 Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927).
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liness toward all searches by state officers,O the decision was ex-
pressly confined to the facts found. 10 A decidedly contrary point
of view had been expressed almost contemporaneously in Mc-
Gwire v. United States."
The often cited Flagg v. United States 22 is perhaps more close-
ly related on its facts to the Gambino case. There a seizure made
by the city police foil the purpose of a federal prosecution for
using the mails to defraud was declared invalid under the federal
rule. But the court in that case simply held that the authority
of the state officers to make the search had been left "largely to
inference and conjecture" and that "to attribute such an elabor-
ate and carefully prepared proceeding as planned to convict the
defendant to a few local patrolmen or to some unknown parties
. . . . makes too severe a demand on the imagination." "3 In
9 "The court must be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant fact with an
eye to detect and a hand to prevent violations of the Constitution by cir-
cuitous and indirect methods." Ibid. 32, 47 Sup. Ct. at 249. "The Fourth
Amendment was adopted in view of long misuse of power in the matter
of searches and seizures both in England and the Colonies; and the assur-
ance against any revival of it so carefully embodied in the fundamental
law, is not to be impaired by judicial sanction of equivocal methods, which,
regarded superficially, may seem to escape the challenge of illegality, but
which, in reality, strike at the substance of the constitutional right." Ibid.
33, 47 Sup. Ct. at 250.
10 "Similar questions have been presented in a variety of forms to the
lower federal courts, but nothing is to be gained by attempting to review
the decisions, since each of them rests as the present case does, upon its own
peculiar facts." Ibid. 33, 47 Sup. Ct. at 250. For an excellent analysis of
the Byars case see Ely, Federal Constitutional Limitations on Searches by
State Authmrity (1927) 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 159. See also Thompson v.
United States, 22 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Marron v. United
States, 8 F. (2d) 251 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). But even in those cases the
reason for excluding the state officer's testimony may, be simply the ina-
bility of the court to segregate the activities of the two agencies. See Leg-
man v. United States, 295 Fed. 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924). Ordinarily, in the
absence of any direct participation by federal agents, the federal rule can-
not be invoked. Kanellos v. United States, 282 Fed. 461 (C. C. A. 4th,
1922); Coates v. United States, 290 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Thomas
v. United States, 290 Fed. 133 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923); Nunn v. United States,
4 F. (2d) 380 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; United States v. O'Neil, 19 F. (2d) 934
(S. D. Idaho, 1927); Gordon v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927). And the mere presence of federal agents at a search conducted
by state officers is not usually deemed sufficient participation. Crawford
v. United States, 5 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); Brown v. United
States, 12 F. (2d) 926 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Klein v. United States, 14 F.
(2d) 35 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
1 ""A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the government
may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers have not
played according to the rule." 273 U. S. 95, 99, 47 Sup. Ct. 259, 260
(1927).




other words the court found evidence of a minutely planned ar-
rangement for the specific search (an element totally lacking
in the Gambino case) and, in absence of proof to the contrary,
it presumed the plans to have been effected at the instigation of
the federal authorities.
There need be no quarrel with a decision which invokes the
federal rule where the search is nothing more than the execution
of some specific agreement made by the local police at the behest
of federal agents.14 But does it follow that a conference between
the two agencies held almost four years prior to the search in
question is to be given the same effect? Or shall we say that any
kind of prior agreement between state and federal officers will
bring a subsequent search within the federal rule, even though,
at the time of the agreement, no search was contemplated? Two
district court rulings in the early years of Prohibition enforce-
ment would seem to support the Gambino case in permitting such
a broad interpretation of the federal rule.15 The court in the
Falloco case having found that a general policy of cooperation
existed between the state and federal agencies, seemed to con-
clude that so long as the result of that policy was to cause a ma-
jority of the prosecutions in the federal courts to be based on
arrests by the local police, the federal rule would be applied. It
was expressly stated that special knowledge or special direction
by the federal agents was unnecessary for each specific case. The
Schuetze decision sets forth a similar point of view.10
These two decisions tending to support the conclusion reached
in the Gambino case run counter to most of the authority on the
question. In this connection Park v. United States,"1 to which
no reference is made in the Gambino case, is significant. The
court in that case held that previous arrangement or cooperation
between state and federal agencies was immaterial, so long as
the direct authorization of the search came from state statutes.
It would seem, therefore, that the Supreme Court deems par-
14 United States v. Costanzo, 13 F. (2d) 259 (W. D. N. Y. 1926).
35 United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 75 (W. D. Mo. 1922) ; In Re Schuetze,
299 Fed. 827 (W. D. N. Y. 1924).
'a "Although in this state there is no concurrent prohibitory law, it was
and is the duty of the local officers equally with federal officers to enforce
all laws passed by congress, and since at the time of the seizure, the officers
engaged therein were co-operating with federal officials, they were required
to strictly comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
It makes no difference that the federal agent of this district was unaware
of the specific search, or that he gave no instruction to the detective or
policeman in relation thereto. It is enough that there was a general ar-
rangement or understanding, express or implied, or an acquiescence to
sedrch premises pursuant to the ordinance of the city or directions of the
police department and use the evidence and discovery for prosecution in
federal courts." In re Schuetze, supra note 15, at 830.
17 294 Fed. 776 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924).
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ticipation or specific agreements unnecessary, where the state
enforcement act has been repealed. It is of course true that most
of the rulings on searches by state officers have been predicated
upon the existence of concurrent state legislation. 8 But does
the court now imply that every search made by a local officer in
pursuit of some violation of a federal statute for which there can
be no concurrent state law is to be evaluated according to federal
standards? The leading case on the federal rule, Wecks v.
United States,19 concerned a conviction for the unlawful use of
the mails, yet the decision expressly excepted the seizures made
by local police.20 Similarly, courts have not been hesitant to ac-
cept evidence from state officers, although unreasonably seized,
where the prosecution has been for bringing liquor into Indian
territory.21 In view of these decisions, it would seem that the
Supreme Court in the Gambbw case has in effect suggested that
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are to be given a much wider
scope than has been traditionally accorded the first ten amend-
ments to the federal constitution. It would be but a short step
from the Gambino case to hold that the constitutional guaranties
embodied in those amendments restrict the activities of state
agencies generally.
It may be argued that the situation in New York is unique.
But, granting the singularity, thd Supreme Court did not seem
affected by decisions of the Court of Appeals in the Second Cir-
cuit dealing with situations similar to that existing in the Gain-
binw case, and decisions, which, we may assume, were influenced
to no small degree by the court's first hand kmowledge of condi-
tions.22
Is Timonen v. United States, 286 Fed. 935 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923) ; Robinson
v. United States, 292 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
19 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
20 "As to the paper and property seized by the policemen, it does not
appear that they acted under any claim of federal authority such as would
make the amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizure. The record
shows that what they did by way of arrest, search and seizure was done
before the finding of the indictment in the federal court, under what sup-
posed right or authority does not appear. What remedies the defendant
may have against them we need not inquire, as the 4th Amendment is not
directed to the individual conduct of such officials.' Ibid. 398, 34 Sup. Ct. at
346. See also Steam v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).21 Elam v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 887 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); LersL-ov v.
United States, 4 F. (2d), 540 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
22 Schroeder v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 60, 64 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925):
"It is true that there is no state enforcement act in the State of New
York, the Aiullan-Gage law having been repealed. That fact, however, is
quite immaterial. If all these local police officers did had been done by
private citizens acting without any color of authority the result would not
have been different." See also Greenberg v. United States, 7F. (2d) 05 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Katz v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
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The effect of-the decision in the Gambino case cannot fail to
be far reaching. By implication, at least, it repudiates most of
the prevailing views on the question in the lower federal courts.
It would also seem that the Supreme Court cannot limit the deci-
sion to New York, but must be ready to extend its holding to all
jurisdictions where state enforcement acts may be repealed. Un-
questionably it makes the so-called "nullification" of the National
Prohibition Act much more real than even the advocates of the
repeal of the state law could have anticipated. It will render the
enforcement of liquor laws in New York much more difficult, and
in many instances impossible. It emphasizes the juxtaposition
of the federal procedure, which seems now to be suffering from
a kind of auto-intoxication, and the procedure of the state courts
in New York which follows the rules of logic and the dictates of
common sense expounded in People v. Defore.23
R. J. S.
ENDEE RECEIVING CONVEYANCE AFTER NOTICE OF PRIOR
EQUITIES AS BONA FIDE PURCHASER
Where a purchaser has paid value and taken a conveyance
from one having the "legal title" to land before receiving notice
of equities of third parties in it, the courts have uniformly pro-
tected him against the prior equities.1 If, in addition to paying
the purchase price, he has only contracted to purchase, however,
it is said that his interest is only an "equitable" one and that as
between the two equities the one which was prior in point of
time prevails.2 With this as the state of the law the problem
has presented itself: Shall the added fact that the purchaser of
a mere "equitable" interest has acquired the "legal" title by a
conveyance after notice of a prior equity entitle him to claim
the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value? Shall one who
has paid value without notice but not obtained a conveyance be
allowed to protect himself by obtaining his conveyance after
knowledge of the prior equity?
The court in the Gambino case attempts, but, it is submitted unsuccess-
fully, to distinguish the Schroeder case.
23 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
1 See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) 2171, n. 8; AMES, LECTURES ON
LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 254, 255; AMES, CASES ON TRUSTS (1893) 286, and
cases cited.
2 See 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2175, nf. 14, 15. This applies,
of course, only where the court considers the two equities "equal." Hume
v. Dixon, 37 Ohio St. 66 (1881) (prior vendor's lien deferred to equity
of later purchaser of equitable title without notice). As few equities are
disfavored as is the vendor's lien, however, this statement describes the
majority of the cases. The rule in Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 48 (1827), and
the doctrine of latent equities would also militate against this statement
were it not for the fact that they do not apply to interests in land.
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The American jurisdictions seem to have reached conflicting
decisions on this question. A minority of the states including
Illinois,3 Iowa,4 North Carolina,* and Ohio r appear to favor pro-
tecting such a purchaser even though he obtained his legal title
after notice. Indiana has distinguished between cases where
the conveyance of the legal title involved a wrong on the part
of the grantor and cases where it did not. Thus an equitable
claimant, A, may obtain a prior right to the land by getting legal
title from a stranger to the transaction by which the first equity
was created 7 but not by receiving a conveyance from the grantor
who had first contracted to sell to B and then contracted to sell
to A.8 Other states do not seem to make this distinction.2 The
federal courts have also evidenced a disposition to protect the
holder of a later equity who has obtained the legal title after
notice.'0
3 See McNary v. Southworth, 58 Ill. 473, 476 (1871).4 Weston & Co. v. Dunlap, 50 Iowa 183, 185 (1873).
5 Carroll v. Johnston, 55 N. C. 120 (1855) (X contracted to sell land to
A, A contracting to sell to P and later to D for value and without notice.
D after notice of P's claim obtained legal title from X by paying the rest
of the price and was held entitled to keep the land); see Jones v. Zolli-
coffer, 4 N. C. 645, 660-661 (1817). But see Goldsborough v. Turner, 67 N.
C. 403 (1872), -where A conveyed in trust for creditors, later sold to B
(giving him an equitable title) and then procured a conveyance of the
legal title by the trustee to B by fraudulently representing that the credi-
tors had been paid. It was held that since B gave no value for the legal
title the deed would be set aside.6 In Dueber Watch Case Mlfg. Co. v. Dougherty, 62 Ohio St. 589, 57 N. E.
455 (1900), the defendanV corporation conveyed a share of stock to A to
qualify him as a director, A agreeing to hold it as trustee. A later con-
tracted to assign this share of stock to the plaintiff as indemnity, the plain-
tiff having no knowledge of the defendant's equity. After notice the
plaintiff obtained legal title by obtaining an assignment from A. It was
held that the plaintiff had a prior claim, one of the three grounds being that
the plaintiff had the rights of a bona fide purchaser even though he had
notice before obtaining legal title. In Gibler v. Trimble, 14 Ohio 323
(1846), the defendants had an equitable title to certain land through
being owners of land warrants from the government. The plaintiffs pur-
chased these warrants from another for value and w,ithout notice and
later, after notice, obtained the legal title by compliance with certain
governmental regulations. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled
to the land.
?Campbell v. Brackenridge, 8 Blackf. 471 (Ind. 1847).8 Gallion v. AI'Caslin, 1 Blackf. 91 (Ind. 1820); see Rhodes v. Green,
36 Ind. 7, 10 (1871).
9 Deuber Watch Case MHfg. Co. v. Dougherty, supra note 6.
1o Fitzsimmons v. Ogden, 7 Cranch 2 (U. S. 1812); see Lea v. Polk
County Copper Co., 62 U. S. 493, 498 (1858); Fidelity Lint. Life Ins. Co.
v. Clark, 203 U. S. 64, 74, 27 Sup. Ct. 19, 21 (1906). See also United States
v. Detroit Lumber Co., 131 Fed. 668, 678 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904); United
States v. Clark, 138 Fed. 294, 299 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905). In these two
latter cases the question was one between the government and the bona
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In a larger number of the states, however, the rule seems to be
that one must have both paid the purchase price and received a
conveyance before notice of prior equities if he is to be given the
rights of a bona fide purchaser. Among the states that have so
indicated are Alabama," Arkansas, 12 Colorado, 3 Kentucky,1
Maryland,15 Massachusetts," Mississippi," Nevada, 8 New Jer-
sey,19 New York,20 Oregon,21 Pennsylvania,22 South Carolina,3
Tennessee,24 and West Virginia.25
Although the majority of the states do not recognize the "equit-
able" purchaser without notice as entitled to the land as against
one having a prior equity, many of them give him a "lien" on
fide purchaser of an equitable estate from a fraudulent transferee from
the government. It seems that a special policy is involved in such cases
as it is felt that at some point titles from the government should become
unassailable in the hands of a purchaser without notice, and the final
issuing of the patent is chosen as this point. See U. S. v. Clark, supra
at 298, 299, where the court said: "What, then, becomes of the security
intended to be given by such an instrument? The innocent holder of such
a patent would have absolutely no security. He could never know what
day, week, month, or year the government might bring him into court and
take away tho title . . . ." These cases also differ from the ordinary
one in; that it is in part the improvements of the purchaser which have
earned the patent from the government.
1 Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Boykin, 76 Ala. 560 (1884); Fash v.
Ravesies, 32 Ala. 451 (1858).
12 See Duncan v. Johnson, 13 Ark. 190, 192 (1852).
13 Paul v. McPherrin, 48 Colo. 522, 111 Pac. 59 (1910), 21 Ann. Cas.
460 (1911) annotation.
"4 Blight's Heirs v. Banks, 6 T. B. Mon. 192 (Ky. 1827); Nantz v. Mc-
Pherson, 7 T. B. Mon. 597 (1828); see Corn v. Sims, 3 Metc. 391, 400, 401
(Ky. 1860); Cline v. Osborne, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 511, 512, 68 S; W. 1083,
1084 (1902).
1 See Atkinson v. McCulloh, 132 At. 148 (Md. 1926).
16 Wenz v. Pastene, 209 Mass. 359, 95 N. E. 793 (1911) (purchaser who
paid price without notice but received notice before deed obtained takes
land subject to unrecorded [equitable] lease); see Ratshesky v. Piscopo,
239 Mass. 180, 184, 131 N. E. 449, 450 (1921).
17 See Kilcrease v. Lum, 36 Miss. 569, 572 (1858).
18 See Boskowitz v. Davis, 12 Nev. 446, 466 (1877) ; Moore v. DeBernardi,
47 Nev. 33, 55, 220 Pac. 544, 547 (1923).
19 Dean v. Anderson, 34 N. J. Eq. 496 (1881) ; see Brinton v. Scull, 55
N. J. Eq. 747, 757, 35 At. 843, 847 (1897) ; Cranwell v. Clinton Realty Co.,
58 Atl. 1030, 1035 (N. J. Eq. 1904); Patterson v. Loiseaux Lumber Co.,
92 N. J. Eq. 569, 581, 114 At. 336, 342 (1921) ; Toplan v. Hoover, 135 At].
463 (N. J. Eq. 1926).
20 See Grimstone v. Carter, 3 Paige 421, 436 (1832) ; Dickinson v. Tilling-
hast, 4 Paige 215, 221 (1833); Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. 273, 301
(1814).
21 See Jennings v. Kierman, 35 Or. 349, 362, 55 Pac. 443, 447 (1899).
22 See Union Canal Co. v. Young, 1 Whart. 410, 432 (Pa. 1836).
23 See Peay v. Seigler, 48 S. C. 496, 514, 26 S. E. 885, 892 (1896).
24 See Pillow v. Shannon, 3 Yerg. 508, 512 (Tenn. 1832).
25 See Webb v. Bailey, 41 W. Va. 463, 469, 23 S. E. 644, 646 (1895).
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the land for the money paid before notice, holding the claimant
of the first equity not entitled to the land, or his claim against
it, until he has repaid the later purchaser.26
The American cases which allow the holder of a junior equity
to obtain a good title as against a senior equity by getting in the
legal title after notice refer to the English cases as their author-
ity. This English doctrine of tabda. in niaufrgio 2" was developed
in connection with the mortgage cases where the third mortgagee
who obtained his mortgage without notice of a second mortgage
and whose claim was a mere "equitable" one, bought in the "le-
gal" first mortgage after notice of the "equitable" second mort-
gage. In this situation the third mortgagee was allowed to
"tack" the first and third mortgages and thus obtain preference
for both over the second mortgage.28  The preference in such
case was one entitling the mortgagee to the amount of his loan
and in this respect was much like that given by many American
courts in the sales cases for the return of the purchase, money
paid before notice of the prior equity20 The doctrine of tacking
mortgages has generally been repudiated in this country It
2r.Weidenbaum v. Raphael, 83 N. J. Eq. 17, 90 At. 683 (1914); Hynes
v. Meador, 193 S. W. 1111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); Youst v. Martin, 3 Serg.
& R. 423 (Pa. 1817); Webb v. Bailey, supra note 25; see Union Canal Co.
v. Young, supra note 22, at 432; Sims v. Richardson, 12 Xy. 274, 276
(1822); Dickinson v. Wright, 56 Mich. 42, 49, 22 N. W. 312, 315 (1885);
Henry v. Phillips, 163 Cal. 135, 140, 124 Pac. 837, 839 (1912); House v.
Davis, 196 Ala. 153, 71 So. 685 (1916); 2 PomRoY, EQUITY JUMPsRnUtlECt
(1918) § 750; Donaldson v. Thomason, 137 Ga. 848, 851, 74 S. E. 762, 703
(1912). Contra: Wenz v. Pastene, supra note 16.
27 This term was used to describe the doctrine that as between two equi-
ties, either could gain preference for his claim by obtaining the legal title
even after notice. AZES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 2G7; 1 STORY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (12th ed. 1877) § 415.
28 Taylor v. Russell [1892J A. C. 244; see Ex parte Knott, 11 Ves.
609, 619 (1806); 3 TaTFANY, op. cit. svpra note 1, § 639.
29 See supra note 26.
20 See Grant v. United States Bank, I Caines Cas. 112 (N. Y. 1804);
Chandler v. Dyer, 37 Vt. 345, 354 (1864) ; 3 TIFFANY, op cit. szpra note 1, §
639, n. 19; AMES, op. cit. supra note 27, at 208, n. 2; 1 STORY, op. cit.
supra note 29, §§ 411-419; 4 KENT, CoImNTAInEs (13th ed. 1884) 171-179.
In Osborn v. Carr, 12 Conn. 195, 210 (1837), the court, after refusing to
follow the tacking doctrine, said: "There are other reasons than those
which we have suggested which, independent of decided cases in our own
courts, would constrain us to reject the English doctrine of tacking. It is
unjust and inequitable, and is supported there, only by the weight of author-
ity. Chancellor Kent calls it 'harsh and unreasonable'. He says: 'There
is -no natural equity in tacking; and when it supersedes a prior incum-
brance, it works manifest injustice. By acquiring a still more antecedent
incumbrance, the junior party acquires, by substitution, the rights of the
first incumbrancer over the purchased security; and he justly acquires
nothing -more. The doctrine of tacldng, is founded on the assumption of a
principle which is not true in point of fact; for, as between A, whose deed
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was disapproved of by English courts and writers as inequitable
even while followed because of the force of precedent, 1 and was
finally abolished by statute, with certain exceptions, in 1924.32
A study of the English cases will show that practically all of
the cases in which the doctrine of tabula in naufragio was ap-
plied were cases of tacking mortgages.3 3  In the few cases in
which one, whose equitable claim was that of a purchaser of the
land, has attempted to perfect his title by obtaining a conveyance
after notice of the prior equity, there appears to be some conflict.
It would seem that the decisions on the point are on the whole
against the application of the doctrine to such a fact situation,
however.3
4
is honestly acquired and recorded today, and B, whose deed is with equal
honesty acquired and recorded tomorrow, the equities upon the estate are
not equal. He who has been fairly prior in point of time, has the better
equity; for he is prior in point of right'."
31 See Jennings v. Jordan, 6 App. Cas. 689, 714 (1881); Jenks, Tho
Legal Estate (1908) 24 L. Q. Rav. 147, 155; AMES, op. cit. supra note 27, at
268, n. 3.
32 LAW OF PROPERTY AcT, (1925) 15 Geo. V, c. 20, § 94:
"(1). After the commencement of this Act, a prior mortgagee shall have
a right to make further advances to rank in priority to subsequent mort-
gages (whether legal or equitable) -
(a) if an arrangement has been made to that effect with the subse-
quent mortgagees; or
(b) if he had no notice of such subsequent mortgages at the time
when the further advance was made by him; or
(c) whether or not he had such notice as aforesaid, where the mort-
gage imposes an obligation on him to make such further advances.
This subsection applies whether or not the prior mortgage was made
expressly for securing further advances.
(2) In relation to the making of further advances after the commence-
ment of this Act a mortgagee shall not be deemed to have notice of a mort-
gage merely by reason that it was registered as a land charge or in a local
deeds registry, if it was not so registered at the date of the original ad-
vance or when the last search (if any) by or on behalf of the mortgagee
was made, whichever last happened.
This subsection only applies where the prior mortgage was made ex-
pressly for securing a current account or other further advances.
(3) Save in regard to the making of further advances as aforesaid
the right to tack is hereby abolished:
Provided that nothing in this Act shall affect any priority acquired before
the commencement of this Act by tacking, or in respect of further advances
made without notice of a subsequent incumbrance or by arrangement with
the subsequent incumbrancer.
(4) This section applies to mortgages of land made before or after the
commencement of this Act, but not to charges registered under the Land
Registration Act, 1925, or any enactment replaced by that Act."
3 See AMES, op. cit. supra note 27, at 269.
34In Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 382 (1739), land was devised to A charged
with the payment of a sum of money to B. A's heir sold the land to C
who paid value before notice of the charge but had notice before he re-
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It would appear, therefore, that the English cases are not
very strong authority for the minority view in this country,
especially in view of the fact that tacking mortgages, to which
the doctrine was principally confined, is not recognized here, and
that if the principle is to be upheld it must stand on its merits
alone. Its merits are hard to discern, whether or not we agree
with the rule that the bona fide purchaser of a mere "equitable
title" is not protected against prior equities. It gives priority
by a hit or miss, catch-as-catch-can method which has nothing
ceived his conveyance. It was held that the land was still subject to the
charge.
In Whitworth v. Gangain, 3 Hare 416, 428 (1844), the court said: "If a
party contracts specifically for a given property, pays the purchase-money,
and obtains the legal title, without notice up to the time of obtaining the
conveyance, as well as of paying his vzoney, that may give him a right to
be preferred to an equitable claim which is prior in point of time." (Italics
ours).
In Sharpe v. Foy, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 35 (1868), where it was held that
the purchaser had priority even though the deed wasn't effectually acknowl-
edged before notice of a prior equity, the court seemed to consider the
fraud of the grantor as important and to rest the holding on a special
rule where there is fraud on the part of a married woman.
In Blackwood v. London Chartered Bank of Australia, L. R. 5 Priv.
Council App. 92 (1874), there is a dictum at page 111 that the doctrine
applies as between purchasers of a contract right to land, but the recording
statute there provided that priority was to be given in such cases not ac-
cording to priority in point of time but according to the time of registration.
The first transferee here did not have his "transfer" recorded at the land of-
fice and the second did. It would seem that this fact alone decides the case.
In Bailey v. Barnes [1894] 1 Ch. 25, 37, the court said in reference to the
doctrine of tabula in naufragio: "It was contended that this doctrine was
confined to tacking mortgages. But this is not so. The doctrine applies
in favour of all equitable owners or incumbrancers for value without notice
of prior equitable interests, who get in the legal estate from persons who
commit no breach of trust in parting with it to them." The holding was
that the bona fide purchaser of an equity of redemption could, by paying
off the mortgage after notice of a prior equitable claim, get an indefeasable
title. No authorities are cited for the proposition that the doctrine applies
to all cases and the court said on page 36: "Equitable owners who are
upon an equality in this respect may struggle for the legal estate, and he
who obtains it, having both law and equity on his side, is in a better
situation than he who has equity only. The reasoning is technical and un-
satisfactory; but, as long ago as 1728, the law was judicially declared to
be well settled and only alterable by Act of Parliament: see Brace v.
Duchess of Marlborough [2 P. Wns. 491]." (Italics ours). The case
cited is merely a typical case permitting the tacking of the first and third
mortgages, and would not seem to have the binding effect attributed to it
by this court in a vendor-purchaser situation.
See also 2 PoRoy, op. cit. supra note 26, § 755; AMzS, toe. cit. Mipra
note 33,
It is settled that the purchaser of an equity from a trustee cannot gain
priority over the cestui of an express trust by getting a conveyance from the
trustee after notice. Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271 (1692).
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to do with the merits of the claims.35 It is a probable explana-
tion of the minority rule that it arose out of the influence of
Sugden, who argued strenuously for protecting the bona fide
purchaser of an equitable title,3 6 and whose ideas were widely
disseminated in this country during the early nineteenth cen-
tury. Although Sugden's theory did not prevail, it did, it is
thought, cause some courts in this 'country to protect such a
purchaser if any pretense could be found for doing so. Examples
of this tendency may be seen in the American cases giving the
equitable purchaser a "lien" for the purchase money paid before
notice 37 and those holding that the transferee of a "chose in
action" takes free of "latent equities." 38
But even if we concede that it is socially and economically de-
sirable to protect the bona fide purchaser of an equitable title,
which is not at all certain,39 this unsystematic, devil-take-the-
hindmost method seems an undesirable one.
EFFECT OF A CESSION OF JURISDICTION BY A STATE TO THE
UNITED STATES
The greatest landed proprietor throughout the several states is
undoubtedly the United States. Besides numerous Indian reser-
vations, national parks, and forest and game preserves, the fed-
eral government maintains military or naval stations in every
state but one,' post offices and court houses in most large cities,2
and many other institutions, from life-saving stations to peni-
tentiaries, throughout the country. Thus, such places as Ft.
Leavenworth, Muscle Shoals, West Point, Sandy Hook and Old
Point Comfort are under federal proprietorship. Moreover, the
United States is the country's greatest landlord. Besides a num-
erous official personnel, its reservations contain thousands of
civilian inhabitants, whose status, by reason of the nature of
federal proprietorship, is often peculiar. They are within the
physical limits of a state but, in many cases, beyond its juris-
diction. Hence they are to a certain extent beyond the law.
85 Cf. EWART, ESTOPPEL (1900) 252, 254.
36 SUGDEN, VENDORS & PURCHASERS (14th ed. 1873) 791, 798.
3 7Supra. note 26.
38 Hopple v. Cleveland Discount Co., 157 N. E. 414 (Ohio App. 1927);
Davis v. Barr, 9 Serg. & R. 137 (Pa. 1822).
39 See HUSTON, Tir ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY (1915) 130,
131. Compare Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice (1886) 1 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 9, 11; Note (1912) 12 COL. L. Rv. 156, 158; (1925) 39 HARV.
L. REV. 271, 272.
1 The military reservations are listed in MILiTARY RESERVATIONS, NA-
TIONAL CEMETERIES AND MILITARY PARKS (Judge Advocate Gen. Dept.
1916).
2 Congress appropriates funds for the erection of approximately 100 new
federal buildings a session. See ROSE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDUREr OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1926) § 91.
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Land for federal undertakings may be reserved by the United
States at the time of a state's admission, or subsequently ac-
quired with or without the state's consent.3 Jurisdiction over
such land may be retained by the United States at the time that
the land is reserved,4 or acquired later by cession from the state
to the United States, under the terms of the Constitution.5 Where
land is acquired without the state's consent, the United States
holds as an ordinary proprietor," except that the state cannot
interfere with the use of the land for governmental purposes.-
But Congress has brought about cessions of jurisdiction over
most lands acquired for federal enterprises by maling such
cession a condition precedent to the spending of public funds
upon the land.8
In the words of the Constitution, a cession of jurisdiction by
a state gives Congress the "Power . . . to exercise exclusive
Legislation" over the territory concerned.0 Federal jurisdiction
becomes "exclusive" in the sense that the only ncw laws respect-
ing private rights applicable thereto," and the only penal laws
3 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875).
4 See Ft. Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 526, 5 Sup. Ct. 995,
996 (1885).
5 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power to exercise
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever . . . over all Places pur-
chased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same
shall be, for the Erection 'of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, Dock-yards and
other needful Buildings."
It has been urged that the phrase "other needful Buildings" means only
other structures for military or defensive purposes. Lieber, Ccosions of
Jurisdiction by States to the UniteZ States (1898) 32 AM. L. Rav. "78;
[1912] Dig. Op. Judge Advocate Gen. 931. But in various acts of cession
the phrase has been construed to include all federal enterprises, as, in
addition to those enumerated supra, aqueducts, cable terminals, canals,
custom-houses, hospitals, land offices, levees, lighthouses, military ceme-
teries, mints, soldiers' homes, and weather bureaus.
6 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 557 (1875); Pothier v. Rodman, 291 Fed. 311 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1923).
7Pundt v. Pendleton, 167 Fed. 997 (N. D. Ga. 1909) (teamster in em-
ploy of quartermaster at national park held under no duty to work on
state roads); United States v. Hunt, 19 F. (2d) 634 (D. Ariz. 1927)
(enforcement of state game law restricting killing, under federal author-
ity, of surplus deer in national forest enjoined).
8 5 Stat. 468, (1841) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 6902 (R. S. § 355):
"No public money shall be expended upon any site or land purchased by
the United States for the purposes of erecting thereon any armory, ar-
senal, fort, fortification, navy-yard, customs-house, lighthouse, or other
public building, of any kind whatever, until the written opinion of the
Attorney General shall be had in favor of the validity of the title, nor
until the consent of the legislature of the State in which the land or site
may be, to such purchase, has been given. . "
9 Supra note 5.
1o Izfra notes 41, 42 and 43.
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existing therein,"' are those enacted or adopted by Congress.
Crimes committed within the territory can only be punished,3
and real actions brought,13 in the local federal court. Transitory
actions arising within the territory may, however, be tried
wherever the plaintiff can get service on the defendant.1'4 A
cession of jurisdiction may concern land already acquired or to
be acquired,15 and may contain such reservations as the state
sees fit to make, providing they do not interfere with the in-
tended use of the property.0 Thus the usual reservation of a
right to serve civil and criminal process with regard to actions
arising within the state but without the territory is considered
a valid measure to prevent the territory from becoming an asy-
lum for fugitives from justice.2' Similarly, the right to tax
1 Thus, state liquor laws penalizing sale without license become inopera-
tive over territory when it is ceded to the United Sates. In re Ladd, 74
Fed. 31 (D. Neb. 1896).
12 Federal courts have jurisdiction: Kelly v. United States, 27 Fed. 616
(C. C. Maine, 1885); Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, 13 Sup. Ct.
60 (1892); United States v. Holt, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2 (1910).
State courts have no jurisdiction: State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331 (1884);
State v. Morris, 76 N. J. L. 222, 68 Atl. 1103 (1908); People v. Hillman,
246 N. Y. 467, 159 N. E. 400 (1927).
It has, however, been held that a federal court had no jurisdiction over
a crime committed at a soldiers' home where Congress, in acquiring the
land, did not unequivocally declare that exclusive federal jurisdiction was
intended or necessary, and where the state ceded only such jurisdiction as
Congress found necessary. In re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545 (E. D. Wis. 1895).
And that the state had jurisdiction over a similar offense, since ownership
of the land by a corporation created by Congress was not ownership by the
United States. In re O'Connor, 37 Wis. 379 (1875); People v. Mouse, 259
Pac. 762 (Cal. App. 1927).
" See Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399, 401, 16 Sup. Ct. 837, 838 (1896)
(wrongful ouster).
14 Madden v. Arnold, 22 App. Div. 240, 47 N. Y. Supp. 757 (3d Dept.
1897), aff'd 162 N. Y. 638, 57 N. E. 1116 (1900) (bite by vicious dog);
Hoffman v. Leavenworth Light Co., 91 Kan. 450, 138 Pac. 632 (1914)
(wrongful death); Kaufman v. Hopper, 220 N. Y. 184, 115 N. E. 470
(1917) (same); Fant v. Arlington Hotel Co., 170 Ark. 440, 280 S. W. 20
(1926) (loss of personal property in hotel fire); Lieber, Zoc. cit. supra
note 5.
5 Ft. Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, supra note 4; United States v. Holt,
supra note 12; 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 480 (1878). Forty-two states have gen-
eral acts of cession, all of them prospective in application, and seven of
them with limitations as to use or size. Thirty-four of these provide for
service of state process within the territory concerned, of which five re-
serve criminal jurisdiction. Twenty-one cede jurisdiction only for as long
as the United States uses the land for federal purposes. For a collection
of acts of cession, both general and special, see MILITARY RESERVATIONS, NA-
TIONAL CEMERERIES AND MILITARY PARIcS, loc. cit. supra note 1.
26 See Ft. Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, supra note 4, at 539, 5 Sup. Ct.
at 1003; ROSE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 96.
', State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763 (1897).
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private property or corporate franchises,"8 or to open roads,'0
may be reserved. But reservations inconsistent with "exclusive"
federal jurisdiction as contemplated by the Constitution, such as
reservations to the state of concurrent or criminal jurisdiction,
while they are not inoperative as reservations, do not comply
with Congressional provisions respecting appropriations,20 ex-
cept where they have been sanctioned by special legislation21
Where the state legislature provides that the cession is only for
as long as the land is used for the purposes enumerated in the
Constitution, it has been held that jurisdiction over such land as
is leased for private enterprise, as a market 22 or hotel,23 reverts
to the state. But where there is no such stipulation, the United
States loses jurisdiction only by abandonment, as where a mili-
tary reservation is opened to Indians and homesteaders," and
no retrocession of jurisdiction to the state is necessary.25
Congress early enacted penal laws for territory over which it
had jurisdiction,26 and in 1825 passed the first assimulation crime
statute,27 providing that where an offense was not specially pro-
vided for by any federal law, it should be prosecuted in the fed-
eral courts and receive the same punishment as the laws of the
state in which the territory was situated prescribed for a like
offense. This statute was held to be not unconstitutional as a
delegation of legislative power,28 since it was construed as adopt-
is Ft. Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, supra note 4.
19 Cf. In re Ladd, supra note 11. But the state does not thereby retain
jurisdiction over the land which the road occupies. People v. Hillman,
supra note 12 (conviction in state court for robbery on highway within
military reservation reversed); cf. Baker v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. Rep. 482, 83
S. W. 1122 (1904).
20 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 611 (1893) ; 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 260, 265, 294 (1918).
But cf. 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 617 (1903).
21 (1880) 21 Stat. 142 authorized the purchase of a site for a federal
building at Montgomery, "provided that no money to be appropriated for
this purpose shall be available until . . . the State of Alabama shall
have ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the same during
the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof, for all
purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of said State and
the service of any civil process therein." For other special acts with
similar provisions, see (1882) 22 Stat. 94, 152, 161; (1885) 23 Stat. 282;
(1887) 24 Stat. 544; (1888) 25 Stat. 444; (1891) 26 Stat. 115, 724.
22Palmer v. Barrett, supra note 13; 17 L. R. A. 720 (1892) annotation.
23 Crook, Homer & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604 (E.
D. Va. 1893).
24La Duke v. Melin, 45 N. D. 349, 177 N. W. 673 (1920). Thus the
federal courts have jurisdiction over a murder committed on a military
reservation, but in a part used for farming. Benson v. United States,
supra note 12.
25 [1912] Dig. Op. Judge Advocate Gen. 934.
2G (1790) 1 Stat. 113.
27 (1825) 4 Stat. 115.
2s Franklin v. United States, 216 U. S. 559, 30 Sup. Ct. 434 (1909).
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ing only such state penal laws as existed at the time of its enact-
ment,2 or re-enactment.30  It has been substantially re-enacted
in 1866,31 when a provision that no subsequent repeal of any state
law should have any effect was added, in 1898,12 and in 1909. 3
It is not operative, however, when the state law in its terms does
not permit of adoption, as where the state law provides that a
prosecution for criminal libel may be brought only in the county
where the libelous paper is published.34
While Congress has thus provided a criminal code for ceded
territory, it has enacted little or no law respecting private rights.
Under the rule of international law applicable when territory
passes from one sovereignty to another, the local law regarding
private rights existing at the time of the cession, so far as it is
not inconsistent with the laws of the United States, has been
held to continue until superseded by federal legislation.33 Thus
a railway has been held responsible as an insurer for the killing
of cattle on its right of way through a military reservation, when
at the time of the cession a state statute imposed on it such re-
sponsibility on failure to fence its track.3 But a refusal on the
part of the War Department to permit fencing because it would
"greatly restrict the use of the reservation for drill and maneu-
ver purposes" has been held a good defense to a similar action."
The laws of negligence 38 and the rights of action for wrongful
death 39 in effect at the time of the cession have likewise been
29 United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (U. S. 1832).
30 United States v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518 (W. D. Ky. 1903). Hence until
reenactment, the statute does not apply to the laws of a state which was
admitted to the union after its enactment. United States v. Barnaby, 51
Fed. 20 (D. Mont. 1892).
31 (1866) 14 Stat. 13.
32 (1898). 30 Stat. 717.
33 35 Stat. 1145, (1909) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 10462, 18 U. S. C. A.
(1927) § 468: "Whoever, within the territorial limits of any state, or-
ganized territory, or district, but within or upon any of the places now
existing or hereafter reserved or acquired, described in § 272 of this act,
shall do or omit the doing of any act or thing which is not made penal by
any law of Congress, but which if committed or omitted within the juris-
diction of the state, territory, or district in which such place is situated,
by the laws thereof now in force would be penal, shall be deemed guilty
of a like offense and be subject to a like punishment; and every such
state, territory, or district law shall, for the purposes of this section, con-
tinue in force, notwithstanding any subsequent repeal or amendment thereof
by any such state, territory or district."
34 United States v. Press Pub. Co., 219 U. S, 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 212 (1911).
35 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 5 Sup. Ct. 1005
(1885).
36Ibid.
37 Anderson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 102 Neb. 578, 168 N. W. 196 (1918).
38 Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011 (S. D. Wash. 1916).
39 Hoffman v. Leavenworth Light Co., supra note 14; Kaufman v. Hop-
per, supra note 14.
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held to continue, except where abrogated by the enactment of
a federal employees' compensation law.4" But state laws, such
as a workmen's compensation act " or a law imposing responsi-
bility on a telegraph company for failure to deliver a message,42
passed subsequent to the cession and creating new causes of
action, have no application. Similarly, where a subsequent state
law, in accord with a change of social policy throughout the
country, abolishes a cause of action which existed at the time
of the cession, it is held that the cause of action still persists in
territory over which jurisdiction has been ceded.
Such is the effect of the recent case of Williams v. Arlhzgton
Hotel Co., 22 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).4 There the
plaintiff brought an action for personal property consumed in the
burning of the defendant's hotel while she was a guest thereof.
The hotel was situated on land leased from the United States
which was a part of the Hot Springs, Arkansas, military reser-
vation. The state had ceded jurisdiction over the reservation to
the United States in 1903, reserving only the rights to serve pro
cess and to tax private property therein. At the time of the ces-
sion, the state law imposed an insurer's responsibility on innkeep-
ers for the loss of property of guests, but in 1913 a statute re-
lieved them of responsibility for loss by fire except where the fire
was started by their intention or negligence. The lower court held
that the act of 1913 applied, on the ground that jurisdiction re-
verted to the state while the land was not being actually used for
governmental purposes, but was reversed on appeal, there being
no express provision for such reverter in the act of cession."
While Congress has kept the penal law of ceded territory rea-
sonably up to date by re-enactment of the assimulation crime
statute, private rights within such territory are in general deter-
mined only by such law as existed at the time of cession, in many
cases fifty or one hundred years ago. Morever, its inhabitants
are usually denied by the state wherein the territory is situated
the civil and political rights which it accords, to residents, and
are given no substitutes by Congress. Thus it has been held that
they are not entitled to vote in state elections,45 to send their
40 Webb v. White Engineering Corp., 204 Ala. 429, 85 So. 129 (1920).
41McCarthy v. Packard Co., 105 App. Div. 436, 94 N. Y. Supp. 203 (1st
Dept. 1905), af'd 182 N. Y. 555, 75 N. E. 1130; Kaufman v. Hopper, upra
note 14.
-Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 29 Sup. Ct. 613
(1909).
43For a similar holding in the state court on identical facts, cee Fant v.
Arlington Hotel Co., suprja note 14.
44 Supra notes 22, 23 and 24.
-5 Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869) (after this decision, Congress,
in (1871) 16 Stat. 399, retroceded jurisdiction to the state); In re Town of
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children to the public schools, 40 to benefit by the poor laws, 47 or
to sue for divorce in the state courts.48 The exemption which
they enjoy from state taxation 41 and from the duty to work on
state roads " seems inadequate compensation for so great a loss
of civil rights. On grounds of necessity it has been held that a
state court retained probate jurisdiction over ceded territory,
Congress not having conferred it on the federal courts,"1 and a
similar view has been expressed by dissenting judges with regard
to divorce.5 2 But by the weight of authority inhabitants of such
territory are considered non-residents of the state for all pur-
poses.5 3
That this situation presents practical difficulties, and not mere-
ly occasional inconvenience, is shown by the frequent rulings of
the Judge Advocate General of the Army with regard to mili-
tary reservations."' Thus he has ruled that there was no federal
appropriation for schools for children at army posts,", and that
officer's children must pay tuition if admitted to the local public
schools50 He has similarly held that the state has no power to
license and regulate marriage ceremonies on a reservation, but
advised that such marriage be entered into in accordance with
the state law as a matter of public record.rT Another opinion
states that the state, unless the domicile of a person dying on a
reservation, has no probate jurisdiction, but advises that the
decedent's effects be taken outside the reservation and turned
over to the administrator appointed by the state. 8 In another
case it was ruled that in the absence of an application by an
administrator appointed by the state of the domicile of the dece-
Highlands, 48 N. Y. St. Rep. 795, 22 N. Y. Supp. 137 (Sup. Ct. 1892);
State v. Willett, 117 Tenn. 334, 97 S. W. 299 (1906).
46 Opinion of the Justices, 42 Mass. 580 (1841).
47 Ibid.
48 Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 At. 729 (1926), 46 A. L. R. 993, an-
notation, 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 146, 40 HARv. L. REV. 130, 11 MINN. L.
REv. 74.
49 Opinion of Justices, supra note 46; 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 577 (1854); Con-
cessions Co. v. Morris, 109 Wash. 46, 186 Pac. 655 (1919).
50 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 468 (1880).
51 Divine v. Unaka Nat'l Bank, 125 Tenn. 98, 140 S. W. 747 (1911).
52 See Lowe v. Lowe, supra note 48, at 602, 133 At. at 733. See also for
the argument ab inconvenienti, Crook, Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort
Hotel Co., supra note 23, at 611.
53 (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv. 130.
54 [1912] Dig. Op. Judge Advocate Gen. 933-943. See also, MILITARY
RESERVATIONS, NATIONAL CEMETERIES AND MILITARY PARXS, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 497-516.
55 [1912-1917] Dig. Op. Judge Advocate Gen. 250.




dent, the effects of a soldier dying on a reservation should be
sold and the money deposited in the Treasury."
What, then, can be done to enable the law of ceded territory
to keep pace with local or national changes in social policy, and
to accord civil and political rights enjoyed elsewhere to its in-
habitants? It seems improbable that Congress could or would
legislate in regard to the varying local needs of these isolated
communities, particularly since they are unrepresented in Con-
gress. It is submitted, however, that Congress could readily make
the modern law of the state in which each reservation is situated
applicable to such reservation by the enactment and frequent
re-enactment of a measure concerning private rights, analogous
to its assimulation crime statute co Such state law seems more
available for adoption than any other, such as that of the District
of Columbia, since it is adjusted to local conditions and already
has a derivative relation to the law prevailing in the territory.
The act of adoption would necessarily limit its scope to such pri-
vate rights as were not regulated by other federal legislation,
and, as in the case of the assimulation crime statute, would
operate only on such state law as was susceptible of adoption.
It is evident that it would afford no remedy for the loss of civil
and political rights incident to residence.
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE DEFENSES TO A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
IN THE HANDS OF A BONA FIDE HOLDER FOR VALUE I
Conflict of laws problems relating to the "title" to negotiable
instruments have, because of the adoption by the states of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, become relatively unim-
portant as far as transactions within this country are concerned.2
When, however, the transactions reach into foreign countries,
the complex problems again become manifest. An example of
59 Ibid.
GO Supra note 33.
IThis comment is concerned with the defenses of payment, failure or
lack of consideration, fraud, misrepresentation, etc., rather than the so-
called "real defenses," such as usury, forgery, illegality, etc., and defenses
arising from some defect in presentment, protest, notice, or some defect in
form making the instrument non-negotiable.
2The problem may, however, still arise in a limited number of situations,
due to the variations from the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
among the states. See Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1927) c. 98, § 77 (rights of
a holder in due course), § 49 (responsibility of an accommodation party),
§ 145 (effect of alteration of instrument), § 75 (definition of defective
title); N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 21, § 373 (declaring usurious
contracts void) ; Wis. Stat. (1921) c. 78, § 1676-22 (as to what constitutes
a holder in due course), § 1676-25 (when title is defective); Minn. Gen.
Stat. (1923) § 724T (when title is defective); BRL -v.ON, NEGOTABLE I.-
STRUMENTS LAW (3d ed. 1920) 105-106.
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the latter situation existed in the recent New York case of Weiss-
man v. Banque De Bruxelles3
Before any question of defenses to the instrument arises it
may be necessary to determine whether the holder is a holder
in due course. It has been suggested that the character of the
holder and the defenses available against him need not neces-
sarily be determined by the same law.4 Yet it is difficult to see
any reason based on logic or poli~y for making a distinction.'
Therefore no distinction will be made except for convenience in
treatment.
The question of what law defines the defenses available against
the good faith holder has most frequently arisen where the de-
fenses have been asserted by the primary parties to the instru-
ment, i.e., maker and acceptor. Where such is the case the Fed-
eral courts 6 and some state courts 7 have taken the attitude that
both the character of the holder as a holder in due course and
the defenses available present a question of the general commer-
cial law as interpreted by the forum. This view, however, does
not prevail in most of the states., The great majority of state
courts have treated defenses as arising from the contract of the
3 221 App. Div. 595, 224 N. Y. Supp. 555 (lst Dept. 1927). In that case
the plaintiff corporation sued the defendant, a Belgian banking corporation,
to recover the proceeds of a check drawn to the order of the plaintiff and
payable at the Treasury of the United States in Washington. The president
of the plaintiff corporation indorsed the check first in his official capacity
and subsequently in his own behalf, and deposited ib with the defendant
bank in Belgium, which credited it to his account. The transfer was with-
out authority and on these facts under New York law the defendant took
the check subject to the president's authority to indorse. Under the law of
Belgium no such duty of inquiry was imposed upon the defendant. The
court held that the law of Belgium, where the transfer t& the defendant
took place, governed.
61 L. R. A. 202 (1903) annotation.
5 LORENZEN, CONFLICT OF LAWS RELATING TO BILLS AND NoTEs (1919)
142:
"To say that the lex loci contractug is the proper law to determine the
nature of the defences which a party may set up against a holder in due
course and against a party who is not a holder in due course and yet to
deny its competency to define what it understands by the term 'holder in
due course' is inconsistent and irrational."
6 As to what constitutes value: Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239
(1879); Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14 (1880). It has even
been suggested in dicta that the Federal courts will in matters of general
commercial law disregard state statutes. See Bank of Edgefield v. Far-
mer's Co-operative Mfg. Co., 52 Fed. 98 (C. C. A. 5th, 1892); Sturdivant V.
Memphis Nat'l Bank, 60 Fed. 730, 734, (C. C. A. 5th, 1894).
Fellows v. Harris, 20 Miss. 462 (1849); Franklin v. Twogood, 18 Iowa
515 (1865), 25 Iowa 520 (1868); Roads v. Webb. 91 Me. 406 (1898); Third
National Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 139 S. W. 665 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911); 2 AMES, CASES ON BILLS AND NoTES (1894) 806.
8 See Sykes v. Bank, 78 Kan. 688, 690, 98 Pac. 206, 207 (1908).
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primary party and so to be governed as to him, at least, by the
law governing his contract contained in the bill or note. In ap-
plying this rule a few of the older cases, in language at least,
have intimated that the contract of the primary party is to be
governed by the law of the place where the contract was techni-
cally made. But today it is supposed that the law of the place
where the note or bill is to be paid governs.10 The language of
the courts in the great majority of these cases is to the same
effect. It is seldom, however, that the cases unqualifiedly sup-
port this proposition on their facts, for rarely do the execution,
payment, and indorsement of the instrument occur each in a
different jurisdiction so as to make the law of the place where
each occurred competing.,, Yet it is possible to predict in a
somewhat negative fashion what the courts will do in given fact
situations. Thus the law of the place of indorsement, when it
differs from that of both the place of execution and payment
will not be held applicable. = Nor does the law of the place of
9 Ory v. Winter, 4 Mart. [N. s.] 277 (La. 1826) (involving the applicabil-
ity of the Mississippi Anti-Commercial statute; place of payment does not
appear); Barrett v. Walker, 14 La. 303 (1840) (place of maing and pay-
ment coincided); Harrison v. Edwards, 12 Vt. 648 (1840) (applying the lex
loci contractus to the defenses of payment and set-off) ; Newton v. Gray, 10
La. Ann. 67 (1855) (set-off; neither the place of payment nor indorze-
ment appear).
The bill or note is technically made at the place where delivered, or
where first delivered for value, if accommodation paper. LOnE.qzE, CAsES
ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1924) 391. Capacity to execute a bill or
note is determined by the law governing capacity to contract in general,
namely, the place where the contract was technically made. Union Na-
tional Bank v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538, 62 N. E. 072 (1902).
1 02 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAws (Parmelee 3d ed. 1905) 971,981; TmE-
MZAN, COMMERCIAL PAPER (1889) § 507; Dicey, Conflict of Laws and Billg
of Echange (1882) 16 AMI. L. Rnv. 497, 506.
1 In the following cases the place of making, payment and indorsement
coincided: Bliss v. Houghton, 13 N. H. 126 (1842) (set-off); Price v. Gat-
lift's Ezers, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 324 (1908) (fraud). Since the forum -was not
the situs of these transactions these cases are, at least, authority for the
proposition that the law of the forum is not applicable.
12 In the following cases the place of making and payment coincided,
though both differed from the place of indorsement, and the law of the
place of "making and payment" was held applicable rather than the law
of the place of indorsement. Wilson v. Lazier, 52 Va. 477 (1854) (failure
of consideration); Evans v. Anderson, 78 IM. 558 (1875) (failure of con-
sideration) ; First National Bank v. Doeden, 113 N. W. 81 (S. D., 1907)
(applicability of Minnesota statute exempting from responsibility anyone
whose signature is obtained by a fraudulent representation as to the nature
of the instrument); Jenks v. Doran, 5 Ont. App. Rep. 558 (1880) (attach-
ment in insolvency). See STORY, CONFLIOT OF LAws (8th ed. 1883) §§ 317,
331, 332.
Compare also Kelly v. Smith, 1 Mete. 313 (Ky. 1858) (applicability of
Kentucky anti-commercial statute so as to cut off defenses of failure of
consideration, fraudulent representations, and redhibitory rights); Miller,
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the execution of the instrument govern when the place of execu-
tion differs from the place of payment and indorsement.13 But
where it is possible to isolate the place of payment from both the
place of execution and indorsement the courts almost uniformly
hold the law of the place of payment to govern.14 To the extent,
then, that the place of payment may be thus singled out, and to
the extent that the language of the courts may be used as au-
thority, it is possible to say that the law of the place of payment
is controlling.
There seems to be some doubt as to whether the above rule is
also applicable to determine whether the holder is a holder in
due course. It has been asserted that there is a substantial con-
flict,5 one line of authority asserting the above rule and another
the rule that the law of the place of transfer governs. Perhaps
half of the cases cited", to sustain the latter rule might with equal
justification be cited to sustain the place of payment rule."T The
Mayhew & Co. v. Mayfield & Traylor, 37 Miss. 688 (1859) (defense of
payment); Creston National Bank v. Salmon, 117 Mo. App. 506 (1906)
(applicability of Iowa statute permitting holder to recover from a de-
frauded maker only the amount he expended). In these cases the law of
the place of "making and payment" was held to control, the place of in-
dorsement not appearing.
13 Brabston v. Gibson, 50 U. S. 263 (1850), where the place of payment
and indorsement coincided while the place of making was elsewhere. The
language of the court was to the effect that the place of payment is con-
trolling. It should be noted, however, that the same result would have been
reached under the law of either state involved.
141n the following cases the execution and indorsement occurred in one
state while the place of payment was in another. Shoe and Leather Na-
tional Bank v. Wood, 142 Mass. 563 (1886) (partial failure of considera-
tion; it does not clearly appear that the court regarded the place of pay-
ment as differing from the place of making); Midland Steel Co. v. Bank,
34 Ind. App. 107 (1904) (ultra vires and failure of consideration) ; Sykes
v. Bank, supra note 8. Compare also the following cases where the place
of making and payment differ, though the place of indorsement does not
appear. Lienkauf Banking Co. v. Haney, 93 Miss. 613, 46 So. 626 (1908)
(Mississippi anti-commercial statute) ; Houston v. Keith, 100 Miss. 83, 56
So. 336 (1911) (failure of consideration); Johnson County Savings Bank
v. Yarbrough, 106 Miss. 79, 63 So. 275 (1913).
152 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 10, at 971; 61 L. R. A. 202 (1903) an-
notation; 19 L. R. A. [N. s.] 671 (1909) annotation.
16 2 WHARTon, op. cit. supra note 10, at 971; 61 L. R. A. 202 (1903)
annotation; 8 C. J. 104.
17 Of the cases cited the following tend most strongly to support the
rule of the place of transfer: Brook v. Vannest, 58 N. J. L. 162, 33 Atl.
382 (1895) (value); Palmer v. Minar, 8 Hun 342 (N. Y. 1876) (notice).
In Russell v. Buck, 14 Vt. 147, 157 (1842), the place of indorsement did not
appear. The extent to which it is authority for the proposition for which
it is cited depends upon the statement of the court that, "This was a
transaction in the state of New York [which is also the place of making
and payment] and must be governed by their decisions." In Roe v. Jer-
ome, 18 Conn. 138, 164 (1846), Waite, J., dissenting, said: "Had the negotia-
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weight of authority seems to apply the same rule here as in the
case of defenses.18
Of course, matters pertaining to the remedy will be governed
by the law of the forum, in keeping with the general conflicts
rule. But what may be included within the term "remedy?"
On one extreme it has been held that the forum in applying the
remedy must determine what is value 0 and whether a set-off
is permissible 2 while on the other the burden of proof and pre-
tion of the bill been made in this state, so as to be governed by our laws
Platt would be entitled to recover." In King v. Doolittle, 38 Term. 77, 88
(1858), the court said: "But, as it appears that the notes in question were
both made and indorsed in the city of Philadelphia, of course the determina-
tion of this question must be governed by the law of the place where the con-
tract of indorsement was made?' In Woodsen v. Owens, 12 So. 207 (Miss.
1892), it was said: '"But the negotiations and contracts were had and made
in the state of Tennessee, whose laws must control" In Holt v. McCann, 42
S. W. 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), the force of the case as authority depends
upon the statement that, "In transactions of this kind the rule is that the
rights of the parties are to be determined by the law in force at the place
-where the contract is made," there being no indication as to whether the
contract of maker or indorser was intended.
The law of the place of indorsement has been held to govern the validity
of the transfer as against the primary parties. McClintick v. Cummins,
3 McLean 158, Fed. Cas. No. 8699 (U. S. C. C. 1843) (Pennsylvania statute
making void the assignment of a note by an unincorporated banking associa-
tion). So too as to ability to transfer. Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McLean 397,
Fed. Cas. No. 4141 (U. S. C. C. 1844) (power of president and directors
to transfer); Clanton v. Barnes, 50 Ala. 260 (1874) (capacity of married
woman to transfer note).
is Roe v. Jerome, supra note 17; McCasky v. Sherman, 24 Conn. 605
(1856) (value); Bright v. Judson, 47 Barb. 29 (N. Y. 1866) (value);
Harrison v. Pike Bros., 48 Miss. 46 (1873) (value; place of indorsement
does not appear); Allen v. Bratton, 47 Miss. 119 (1872) (value, effect of
taking instrument after maturity); Woodruff v. Hill, 116 Mlass. 310 (1874)
(value); Green v. Kennedy, 6 Mo. App. 577 (1879) (value); Webster v.
Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 394, 8 Atl. 482 (1886) (value); Tyrell v.
Cairo & St. L. R. Co., 7 Mo. App. 294 (1879) (value; place of execution
and indorsement do not appear); First National Bank v. Dean, 16 N. Y.
Supp. 107 (1891), aff'd 17 N. Y. Supp. 375 (Sup. Ct. 1892) (value given for
warehouse receipt); Badger Mach. Co. v. U. S. BanLk and Trust Co., 16
Wis. 188, 163 N. W. 188 (1917) (value); Pratt v. Dittmer, 197 Pac. 365
(Cal. App. 1921) (notice; place of indorsement does not appear).
No cases were found applying the law of the place of execution of the
instrument to determine the character of the holder.
'19 Ives v. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allen 236 (Mass. 1861).
20 Bank v. Hemingray, 31 Ohio St. 168 (1877); Armour v. Mclichael,
36 N. J. L. 92 (1872) (where, after announcing the rule that the lex fowi
must govern the remedy, the court said: "No proof having been submitted
that in New York a different rule prevails from that which applies here,
it is not necessary to consider whether the question of allowing a set-off
is to be considered as part of the remedy and therefore to be controlled
by our own law."); DAvis v. Morton, 68 Ky. 160 (1868); Stevens v. Grcgg,
89 Ky. 461 (1890) (where the court seems to hold the kx fori applicable
to contracts "made with reference to the common or general law," but
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sumptions on the issue of who is holder in due course have been
held to be substantive so as to be governed by the law of the
place where the instrument was made and to be paid.2 1 By the
prevailing view, however, the question of what defenses are
available is held to be substantive.2 2 And it would seem the bet-
ter rule to treat matters such as the type of evidence admissible
and the presumptions to be indulged as remedial. 3
Where the holder's title is to be determined with respect to
persons other than those primarily responsible on the instru-
ment, it becomes important to know the nature of the suit, i.e.,
whether it is sought to charge the secondary party on his re-
sponsibility as such party,24 or whether the issue is that of the
holder's right to retain the instrument and enforce the obliga-
tion of the primary party.25  If the former, the duty of the sec-
holds the statutory law of the loci solutionis applicable when such place is
nominated, and to this extent overrules Davis v. Morton, supra).
21 Emanuel v. White, 34 Miss. 56 (1857) (presumption that holder is
a bona fide holder for value); Webster v. Howe Mach. Co., supraz note 18
(burden of proof); Houston v. Keith, 100 Miss. 83, 56 So. 336 (1911) (bur-
den of proof).
22Yeat nan v. Cullen, 5 Blacl. 240 (Ind. 1839) (fraud, failure of
consideration) ; Roe v. Jerone, supra note 17; Limerick National Bank v.
Howard, 71 N. H. 13, 51 Atl. 641 (1901) (notice); Creston National Bank
v. Salmon, supra note 12.
23 Harrison v. Pike Bros., supra note 18 (1893) (where the lox for as
to presumptions was applied); Robertson v. Burdekin, 3 Scots Rev, Rep.
(2d series) 593 (1843) (kind of evidence admissible); Mackenzie v. Hall,
9 Scots Rev. Rep. (2d series) 73 (1854); 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note
10, at 972.
Today. uniformity is secured in this country by section 59 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. See also English Bills of Exchange Act
(1882) § 30.
The forum also determines the plaintiff's right to sue in his own name.
Warren v. Copelin, 4 Metcalf 594 (Mass. 1842); 61 L. R. A. 222 (1903)
annotation. However, suit will be allowed in the name of a transferee
of an executor appointed in a foreign jurisdiction if the transfer be valid
when made. Andrews v. Carr, 26 Miss. 577 (1853); Owen v. Moody, 29
Miss. 79 (1855).
24 The rights and duties of the secondary party are here considered with
respect to a remote indorsee or one who is in a position to assert the rights
of a bona fide holder for value against the secondary party.
25 As against the primary parties no distinction seems to have been
drawn because of the nature of the suit. Thus the law of the place where
the instrument is payable governs as well where the maker affirmatively
challenges the holder's right to the instrument, e. g., where the maker sues
for cancellation. Wilson v. Lazier, supra, note 12; Newton v. Gray, supra
note 9 (suit by maker to have set-off allowed); Emanuel v. White, supra
note 21; Allen v. Bratton, supra note 18.
According to article 15 of the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes adopted by the Convention of the Hague of 1912, the
holder is permitted to retain the instrument as against one dispossessed
in any way whatever, "unless he has acquired it in bad faith or in acquir.
ing it has been guilty of gross negligence." According to article 16,
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ondary party to pay is said to arise from his contract, evidenced
by his endorsement, and so to be governed by the law governing
his contract.2 If the latter, according to the Wcissmcan case 2T
the situation is to be analogized to a transfer of personal prop-
erty and, as a consequence, the holder's rights are to be deter-
mined in accord with the law of the situs,2s which in the case of
a negotiable instrument will be the place where the transfer
occurred.
. Perhaps some reason for treating a negotiable instrument as
a contract or as a chattel, depending upon the nature of the suit,
or the parties involved, may be found in a consideration of the
"A party sued on a bill of exchange cannot set up against the holder any
defense based upon his personal relations with the drawer or with prior
holders unless the transfer took place pursuant to a fraudulent under-
standing." See LORENZEN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 269.
26 Sullivan v. German National Bank, 18 Colo. App. 99 (1902) (where
the legality of the contract of indorsement was held to be governed by the
law of the place of indorsement); Colonial National Bank v. Duerr, 103
App. Div. 215, 95 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1st Dept. 1905) (material alteration-
but query whether the contract of the accommodation indorser should not
have been held to have taken effect as an Ohio contract where the instru-
ment was first delivere& for value rather than as a New York contract
where the indorsement was actually made); Krieg v. Palmer National
Bank, 51 Ind. App. 34, 95 N. E. 613 (1911) (defense of fraud); Wood v.
Gibbs, 35 Mliss. 559 (1858) (defenses of failure of consideration and inca-
pacity in a suit against the drawer); TIEDE MN, op. cit. smpra note 10,
at § 508. But see National Bank of Mlichigan v. Green, 33 Iowa 140, 14G
(1871), where it was held that in determining the holder's rights in the ab-
sence of a governing statute at the place of indorsement, "the decisions of
Illinois, construing the common law or law merchant applicable to a con-
tract made then, do not conclude the courts of this state as to what the law
is." Contra as to the drawer: Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky, 41 Bliss. 212
(1866) (where the defenses of usury and payment in a suit by the holder
against the drawer were held to be governed by the law of the place where
the bill was payable). For the general rule as to the drawer see Hunt v.
Standart, 15 Ind. 33 (1860) (that the contract of the drawer is to be gov-
erned by the law of the place where the bill is drawn).
Since the indorsement rarely stipulates a place for performance of the
contract of indorsement, the latter will usually be governed by the law of
the place where the indorsement was made. See Hunt v. Standart, supa.
27 Supra note 3.
28 Accord: Culver v. Benedict, 13 Gray 7 (Blass. 1859) (where owner of
bearer bonds sued to obtain possession of them from the transferee of his
agent who had acted in excess of his authority); Alcock v. Smith [1892]
1 Ch. 238; Keyes v. Wood, 21 Vt. 331 (1849) (where the court said: "If
it be conceded, that such is the law of New York [where the transfer tool:
place] and that it is binding upon these parties, it does not appear to us
that the plaintiff will be aided thereby"); INon, CONFLICT oF LAws,
(1901) 392.
Cf. Wylie v. Speyer, 62 How. Pr. 107 (N. Y. 1881) (where the bonds
were treated as chattels but the law of the plaintiff's domicil was held to
govern). This case is disapproved by the Weissman case though the lat-
ter attempts to distinguishl the two.
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theoretical nature of a negotiable instrument and especially that
phase of negotiability which cuts off defenses in the hands of a
bona fide holder for value. Writers have disagreed as to the
theory which will reconcile these features of negotiability with
the common law. It has been asserted that the element of nego-
tiability which permits the defenses of primary parties to be
cut off in the hands of a good faith holder is due to the circum-
stance that the contract of a primary party runs directly to the
bearer 29 or indorsee once he is ascertained.30 It has also been
stated that the result is derived from an analogy to property
law.31 Whichever rationalization is adopted, in a case involving
purely domestic facts, the result is identical, i. e., the bona fide
purchaser will be protected. This is not necessarily so where a
conflict of laws problem arises. In the latter situation if the
"contract theory" be adopted the rule ordinarily applicable to
debts will be applied: namely, that the assignment wherever
made will not vary the obligation of the debtor. 2  If, on the
other hand, the property analogy be adopted, the situs will gov-
29 Story, J., in Bullard v. Bell, 1 Mason 243, 252 (C. C. Me. 1817): "The
note is an original promise by the maker to pay any person who shall be-
come the bearer; it is therefore payable to any and every person who suc-
cessively holds the note bona fide, not by virtue of any assignment of the
promise, but by an original and direct promise, moving from the maker
to the bearer." See also 2 STREr, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906)
371, 395.
30 "It [the negotiable instrument] borrows from the law of contract the
principle that the person primarily liable is personally bound by his con-
tract to pay the indorsee or bearer producing the bills; and that, there-
fore, no defense which he might have had to claims by other persons, and
no question of title to the bill, can be any answer to an indorsee or bearer
producing the bill, who has acquired it in good faith and for value." 8
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1922) 145. See also Robertson
v. Burdekin, supra note 23, at 605.31,"Analogies for the familiar doctrine that a bona fide purchaser of
commercial paper may not be subject to defenses to the promise sued upon
must be sought outside the field of contract law. When the courts began
to recognize that a bona fide purchaser might strip the obligation of de-
fenses, there were well known situations in the realm of property law in
which a bona fide purchaser did stand better than his transferor and it
would not be surprising if these instances served as guiding analogies. The
bill or note, particularly the former, was a substitute for money which was
property, the bona fide purchaser of which was protected against certain
infirmities in the title. To this extent the bill or note was looked upon,
not as the evidence merely of certain promissory undertakings, but as a
piece of property." Aigler, Payees as Holders in Due Course (1927) 36
YALE LAW JouRnxAL 608, 620. See also 2 AmEs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 866.
It has also been argued that the characteristic of a negotiable instrument
which permits defenses to be cut off when in the hands of a bona fide
purchaser for value is not a principle peculiar to negotiability or to the
law merchant but is merely a phase of the ordinary law of estoppel. Ewart,
Negotiability and Estoppel (1900) 16 L. Q. REv. 135.
32 DICEY, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (4th ed. 1927) 580.
COMMENTS
ern the effect of the transfer even as against the primary parties.
The courts have chosen to follow the former 23 at least as respects
parties to the instrument34 In determining the rights of the
holder who has been fraudulently deprived of the instrument,-
however, the courts have proceeded rather to draw an analogy
on the basis of the property principles said to be embodied in a
negotiable instrument,-' and have held the situs to control.3'
If it be conceded that it is necessary to characterize a nego-
tiable instrument as being essentially either a contract or a chat-
tel in order to harmonize the anomalous consequences of negotia-
bility with the common law, such characterization need not neces-
sarily furnish the criterion by which to choose the applicable con-
flicts rule. Whether the instrument should be treated as a con-
tract or as a chattel in a certain fact situation should, it seems,
be determined for the purposes of conflicts of laws from consid-
erations of convenience and expediency or, in short, policy.
It is submitted that the use of negotiable instruments as a de-
vice for payment in a foreign jurisdiction as well as the general
policy in favor of a free circulation of such instruments would
best be furthered by holding the transferee to that law of which
he is most likely to be cognizant, namely, the law of the situs
at the time of the transfer38 And this should be the rule whether
33 But in Brook -,. Tannest, supra note 17, where the plaintiff was seek-
ing to establish his character as a holder in due course as against the
maker, the court said: "the validity of a contracf depends upon the laws
of the state where the contract is made. But a transfer of personal prop-
erty which is valid by the law of the place where such transfer is made is
sufficient to pass a valid title to it."
34 See supra notes 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. In Bliss v. Houghton, 1G N. H.
90, 92 (1844), the court said: "By the laws of the place where the contract
was made, which, as has been said, form a part of the contract itself which
resulted between the parties to this suit [indorsee and maker] from the
indorsement under which the plaintiff claims, his right under that act
extended no further than to enable him to recover of the defendant the sum
which he owed the indorser at the moment of the transfer."
35 It has been argued that the contract analogy should be extended even
to this situation. See the argument of Haldane, Q. C., for the plaintiffs
in Alcock v. Smith, supra note 28, at 251.
3- "It [the negotiable instrument] borrows from the law of property the
easy method of assignment by means of an indorsement and delivery, or a
delivery merely of the instrument." HomnswoRTxI, op. cit. supra note 30,
at 145.
37 See cases supra note 28.
38 The reason for the rule is accentuated in case of a suit against the
indorser, for the place of indorsement may not appear on the instrument,
and as against the indorser the indorsement is presumed only "prima facie
to have been made at the place where the instrument is dated." N. L L.
§ 46. While as against the maker there is a conclusive presumption in
favor of a holder in due course to the effect that the instrument was exe-




the holder seeks to establish the responsibility of a party to the
instrument 3 9 or is defending an action for conversion brought
by a prior defrauded holder or other person.
The effect of the transfer of a negotiable instrument is con-
sidered in the Restatement on Conflicb of Laws. According to
section 282:
"When a right is by the law which created it embodied in a
document, the validity and effect of a conveyance of the right de-
pend upon the validity and effect of the conveyance of the docu-
ment, and are governed by the law of the state in which the docu-
ment is situated at the time of the conveyance."
If it be intended in section 282 to treat the negotiable instru-
ment as a chattel to such an extent as to make the effect of a
conveyance of the "right" as against all parties depend upon the
situs, then the rule suggested above will be achieved. The
difficulty with the restatement is that it fails to describe the
parties with respect to whom the law of the situs is controlling.40
But if it be conceded that the effect of section 282 is to apply the
law of the situs as against all persons, it does not seem useful
to conceive of the "right" as being "created" in vacuo and at a
particular place, since the quantum of the right would vary with
the situs.
It has also been suggested that
"each party ought to be held if the holder of the instrument
has acquired title in accordance with the municipal law of the
state where such party's contract was made, but that title ac-
quired in conformity with the law of the place of transfer shall
be recognized with respect to all parties." 41
While such a rule would tend to promote the free circulation
of negotiable instruments by giving to the transferee additional
protection, it may, perhaps, be doubted whether the courts would
as yet be willing to go so far at the expense of the parties to the
instrument.
An extension of the rule in the Weissman case so as to make
the law of the situs controlling as to all persons, as has been
39 Supr note 33.,
40 The same objection might be made to section 379 of the Restatement
on the Conflict of Laws covering Contracts. According to that section the
validity of the transfer of a mercantile instrument is governed by the
situs. It is to be noted that this section differs from section 282. in that
the word "effect" is omitted. However, it may be that the effect of the
transfer is considered in this section and is more definitely described than
in section 282 by the Comment (a)J under section 379 to the effect that
"In the case of a negotiable instrument it Ethe transfer] may also cut off
equities." But even the latter section leaves it uncertain as to whom the
equities are cut off.
41 LORENZEN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 140, 142.
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suggested, would have an immediate effect on foreign banking
transactions. Under the rule 42 now obtaining in this country
American banks are privileged to refuse payment on negotiable
obligations of American makers or acceptors presented by for-
eign banks when title which is defective according to the N. I. L.
has been acquired by the latter. And where title has been ac-
quired in accordance with the law of the situs, since by virtue
of this fact there is no recourse against the transferor, foreign
banks are compelled to take the risk of having acquired title in
accordance with our law. Such an undue hazard in doing busi-
ness with this country may well be resented by foreign banks.
It is submitted that an adoption of the rule suggested 3 would
achieve a desirable result by eliminating this possible source
of friction from our foreign commercial relations.
STATUTORY EXTENSION OF JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW
The legislature of Massachusetts enacted in 1926 that,
"The courts shall take judicial notice of the law of the United
States or of a state, territory or dependency thereof or of a
foreign country whenever the same shall be material." 1
In the case of Holmes v. DUnning 2 the Massachusetts court
took judicial notice of judicial decisions in Ohio and the District
of Columbia, the same being pertinent to the question before the
court.
In 1918 the legislature of Virginia provided by statute that,
"whenever in any case it becomes necessary to ascertain what
the law, statutory or otherwise, of another state or country, or
of the United States is or was at any time, the court, judge or
other judicial officer or tribunal shall take notice of and may
consult any book of recognized authority purporting to contain,
state or explain the same, and may consider any testimony, in-
formation or argument that is offered on the subject." 3
Two years after this statute had been enacted the highest court
of Virginia stated, in a case involving the law of a sister state,
42 See N. I. L. §§ 23, 88.
3 According to the rule in England the situs determines the validity of
the indorsement. Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [1905] 1 .K. B. Div.
677. But where an inland bill is indorsed in a foreign country English
law governs the interpretation of the indorsement. Lebel v. Tucker, L.
R. 3 Q. B. 77 (1867). These cases are codified in the English Bills of
Exchange Act § 72.
1 Mass. Acts 1926, c. 168. The enactment of this statute was doubtless the
result of the recommendation of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts.
FIRST REPORT OF THE JUDICILL COUNCIL OF ALASSACHUSETTS (1925) 36.
2 57 N. E. 358 (1926).
3 Va. Acts 1918, 318; Va. Gen. Laws (1923) § 6194a. This section was
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that the proof of such law was to be made to the jury, but that
the interpretation of the same was for the court.4 No hint is to
be found in the opinion of the court that a judicial notice statute,
the passage of which was doubtless designed to change the very
rule applied by the court in this particular case, existed in the
state. Thus, by halting steps the rules with respect to the proof
of the law of a sister state are changing in an increasing number
of states by virtue of legislative command or encouragement.
The rule is well settled that in the absence of statute the courts
of one state will not judicially notice the laws of another state-'
The conventional phraseology of the rule was that the laws of
a sister state were facts which must be proved in the same man-
ner as any other facts. Some courts, in an attempt to adhere to
the inaccurate statement that the court passes upon the law and
the jury upon the facts, allowed the proof of foreign or sister-
state law to be made to the jury and a number even went so far
as to allow the interpretation of the law to be made by the jury."
Many courts, however, balked at letting the jury interpret the
law of another state, and the result was that in a number of
states the proof of the existence of the law was made to the jury
but the interpretation of the same was made by the court."
The inconvenience of proving foreign law in accordance with
the rules of the common law or statute led the court of some
states to make an exception to the general rules set out in the
preceding paragraph in cases involving suits on sister-state
judgments. In this class of cases the question often arises as
to the effect which the judgment has in the state of its rendi-
tion,8 and to simplify the procedure whereby the rules governing
quite obviously based on the West Virginia statute reprinted in the ap-
pendix.
4 Fourth Nat. Bank of Montgomery v. Bragg, 127 Va. 47, 63, 102 S. I.
649, 654 (1920).
Z 5 WIGAMORE, EvMIENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2573; 67 L. R. A. 34 (1905)
annotation.
6 5 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra, note 5, 2558; Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury
Tiials (1890) 4 HARV. L. REV. 147; 11 Am. Dec. 780 (1886) annotation;
34 A. L. R. 1445 (1925) annotation. The Massachusetts rule seems to have
been, prior to the enactment of the statute referred to supra note 1, that
if the statute and decisions under it were clear the interpretation of the
same was for the court, but if there were numerous and conflicting deci-
sions the task was one for the jury. Wylie v. Cotter, 170 Mass. 356, 49
N. E. 746 (1898); Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass. 39, 51 N. E.
207 (1898). To plead sister-state laws in a demurrer renders the latter
bad as a speaking demurrer. Bennett v. Lohman, 292 Mo. 477, 238 S. W.
792 (1921).
7 5 WIGIIORE, loc. cit. supra note 6.
8 U. S. Rev. Stat. (1874) § 905, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1519, pro-
vides that a judgment shall have the effect in the state to which it is taken
that it has by "law or usage" in the state in which it is rendered.
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the effect of the judgment in the state of its origin the courts of
a number, though not all, of the states adopted the practice of
taking judicial notice of the laws of a sister-state in judgment
cases.9 The state courts have always noticed the federal laws 1 0
and the laws in force in states out of whose territory they were
carved at the time of the separation,1 but they seemed hesistant
to extend the doctrine of judicial notice to the laws of sister
states in general. The feeling of separateness and independ-
ence on the part of the people in the states during the first dec-
ades of our national history doubtless contributed much to this
hesitancy. Another factor of some importance in causing the
state courts to refuse to take judicial notice of sister-state laws
was the scarcity of statute books and printed reports of judicial
decisions. Modern lawyers would have difficulty in appreciating
the seriousness of this problem to both city and country lawyers
in the period before the Civil War.
Thirteen states now have statutes relating to the judicial
notice of the laws of foreign or sister states. 2 These statutes
vary in many respects and a brief summary of their provisions
may be of interest.
1. Wkat -may be judicially noticed?
Arkansas---laws.
Connecticut-public statutes and judicial decisions.
Georgia-public laws.
Illinois (The Municipal Court of Chicago)-laws of a pub-
lic nature.
Massachusetts-law.
iichigan-constitution, laws and resolutions as well as the
unwritten or common law.
lMlississippi-law.
New Jersey "I-reports of judicial decisions.
9 Field, Judicial Notice of Public Acts Unzder the Full Faith and Credit
Clause (1923) 12 MINN. L. REV. 439. Cf. subsection 64 of the North
Dakota statute in the appendix.
3.0 1 JONES, EVIDENCE (Henderson ed. 1926) § 404.
" 5 WmroRE, loc. ciL supra note 5, § 2573e. State laws incorporated into
or adopted by laws of Congress are noticed by the state courts. Flanigan
v. The Washington Ins. Co., 7 Pa. St. 306 (1874).
'12 These are reprinted in the appendix.
13 New Jersey has provided as to "statute-books and pamphlet session
laws of other states" that they shall be evidence in the courts of the state,
"and the court may determine whether any book or pamphlet offered as
such" was printed and published under the authority of the state of which
they purport to be the laws, within the requirements of the New Jerzey
statute that books so published shall be evidence of such laws. While this
statute does not use the phrases "judicial notice" or "judicial cognizance,"
it would seem to accomplish substantially the same result as that attained
by judicial notice statutes, in so far as the proof of such laws is, under




Virginia-law, statutory or otherwise.
West Virginia-law, statutory or otherwise.
Wisconsin-public laws.
Some of the states providing that judicial notice may be taken
of the law or laws of a sister state have construed these terms
to include judicial decisions.'
2. To the law of what jurisdictions does judiciaZ notice extend?
Arkansas-other states.
Connecticut-(a) statutes of the states and territories of
the United States.
(b) reports of judicial decisions of other
states and countries.
Georgia-United States and states thereof.
Illinois-state or territory of the United States.
Massachusetts-United States, state, territory, dependency,
or foreign country.
Michigan-state, territory, or foreign country.
Mississippi-United States, state, territory, District of
Columbia, or foreign country.




Virginia-United States, state, or country.
West Virginia-United States, state, or country.
Wisconsin-any state or territory of the United States.
3. Is judicial notice discretionary or compulsory upon the
judges? Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia,. Massachusetts, Miss-
issippi, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin provide that the
courts shall judicially notice or recognize the laws of other
states or countries, as the case may be. Words of authorization
such as will or may are used in Tennessee, Michigan, North
Dakota, and Illinois with reference to laws, statutes, etc., and in
permit the court, as the true judicial notice statute would, to notice sister-
state laws on its own initiative.
14 Holmes v. Dunning, supra note 2; Wells v. Gress, 118 Ga. 466, 45 S. E.
418 (1903); Missouri Ins. Co. v. Lovelace, 1 Ga. App. 446, 58 S. E. 96
(1907); Watkins Medical Co. v. Johnson, 129 Ark. 384, 196 S. W. 465
(1917).
Municipal ordinances of other states would perhaps not be included in
any of the statutes thus far enacted. In the absence of statute most state
courts refuse to take judicial notice of the municipal ordinance of their
own state and it would therefore not be likely that under statutes authoriz-
ing judicial notice of laws, statutes, judicial decisions, etc., the courts
would judicially notice the municipal ordinances of other states. 5! WIa-
moRn, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2572; 4 L. R. A. 41 (1889) annotation.
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Connecticut and New Jersey with reference to judicial decisions.
It seems, however, that the courts are under no obligation to
take judicial notice of the laws of another state unless one of
the parties requests it, although the court would seem to be at
liberty to notice foreign or sister-state laws on its own initiative
in the absence of such a request. Most of the courts that have
passed on the question have held that judicial notice does not
dispense with the necessity of pleading a statute on which re-
liance is had in the case, and there is some intimation that this
is necessary to avoid the presumption of similarity which is in-
dulged by many courts.1 North Dakota, Virginia and West
Virginia include provisions as to sources of information for the
courts, and state that they mwy consult the particular sources
named, although other sources are perhaps not excluded.
The effect of judicial notice would seem to be to dispense
with proof of the laws in the sense of giving evidence that would
show that the laws were really the laws of the particular state.
Whatever evidence is offered is not strictly evidence, but rather
by way of information for the court. For that reason the usual
rules of evidence would not apply, and when the court took notice
of sister-state law such notice would not be rebuttable."'
4. What courts within the state are to take judicial -notice of
the laws of foreign ar sister states? In Arkansas, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Dakota and Wis-
consin the provision applies to "the courts" of the state. Illinois
has thus far authorized only the Municipal Court of Chicago to
apply the doctrine. Mississippi, Virginia and West Virginia use
terms such as "the court," "judge," or "magistrate" and from
the context in which they are used it seems clear that they are
applicable to all the courts of the state. Tennessee has a peculiar
statute in that it authorizes the superior court on appeal to
notice the laws of other states if the same have been introduced
in evidence in the lower court, but not otherwise, although it is
not necessary for the statutes noticed by the superior court under
these circumstances to be set out in the record. 7
15 Savannah, Florida and Western Ry. v. Evans, 121 Ga. 391, 49 S. E.
308 (1904) ; State v. Rose, 41 N. D. 251, 177 N. W. 879 (1919) ; cf. War-
neke v. Preissner, 103 Conn. 503, 138 AtI. 809 (1925).
16 Professor Wigmore takes the view that judicial notice is generally
rebuttable. 5 WIGIORE, Op. cit. supra note 5, § 2567, n. 5. Contra: 5 ENc.
of Evm. (1904) 821, 833. If not rebuttable, the rule as to judicial notice
of the laws of another state becomes one of substantive law, rather than
a rule of evidence. Compare the Mississippi statute reprinted in the
appendix.
7 This creates a situation within the state of Tennessee with respect to
judicial notice of sister-state statutes which is similar to that existing in
the event that a case comes to the Supreme Court of the United States on
writ of error from a state court. In Hanley, v. Donaghue, 116 U. S. 1, 6
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In conclusion it may be proper to call attention to the brevity
and inclusiveness of the Massachusetts statute. It should serve
as a model for legislative draftsmen in the many states in which
statutes dealing with judicial notice of foreign or sister-state
laws are likely to be discussed and enacted in the near future.
O. P. F.
APPENDIX
Arkansas Ark. Dig. Stat. (Crawford, 1921) § 4110: "The
courts of this state shall take judicial knowledge of
the laws of other States."
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5726: "The public statutes
of the several states and territories in the United
States, as printed by authority of the state or terri-
tory enacting the same, and the private or special
acts of this state, shall be legal evidence, and the
courts shall take judicial notice of them."
Section 5727: "The reports of the judicial decisions
of other states and countries may be judicially noticed
by the courts of this state as evidence of the com-
mon law of such states or countries, and of the judi-
cial construction of the statutes or other laws thereof."
Georgia Ga. Code (1926) § 5818: "The public laws of the
United States, and of the several states thereof, as
published by authority, shall be judicially recognized
without proof."
Illinois Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1927) c. 37, § 447-2. The Muni-
cipal Court of Chicago is authorized to take judicial
notice of "laws of a public nature enacted by any
state or territory of the United States."
Massachusetts Mass. Acts 1926, c. 168: "The courts shall take judi-
cial notice of the law of the United States or of a
state, territory or dependency thereof or of a foreign
country whenever the same shall be material."
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) § 12,513: "Printed copies
of the constitution, laws and resolutions of any other
of the United States, or of any territory thereof or
of any foreign state, if purporting to be published
under the authority of the respective governments, or
if commonly admitted and used as evidence in their
courts shall be admitted in all courts, and in all pro-
ceedings within the state, as prima facie evidence
thereof; and the courts of this state may take judicial
notice thereof without their formal introduction as
evidence."
Section 12,515: "The unwritten or common law of
any other of the United States, or of any territory
thereof, or of any foreign state or country, may be
proved as facts by parol evidence, and the books of
Sup. Ct. 242 (1885), the Supreme Court refused to notice judicially the
laws of state X in a case coming on writ of error from state Y unless state
Y would judicially notice the laws of state X. For a criticism of this de-





reports of cases adjudged in their courts may also be
admitted as evidence of such laws; and the courts
may take judicial notice of the same as in the case of
statutes."
Miss. Ann. Code (Hemingway, 1927) § 771: "When
any question shall arise as to the law of the United
States or of any other state or territory of the United
States, or of the District of Columbia, or of any for-
eign country, the court shall take notice of such law in
the same manner as if the question arose under the
law of this state."
N. J. Comp. Stat. (1910) 2229, par. 26: "The re-
ports of the judicial decisions of other states and
countries may be judicially noticed by the courts of
this state, as evidence of the common law of such
states or countries and the judicial construction of
the statutes, or laws thereof, and the usual printed
books of such reports shall be plenary evidence of such
decisions!'
N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) § 7937: "No evidence
of any fact of which the court will take judicial notice
need be given by the party alleging its existence, but
the judge upon being called upon to take judicial
notice thereof may, if he is unacquainted with such
fact, refer to any person, document or book of refer-
ence for his satisfaction in relation thereto, or may
refuse to take judicial notice thereof unless and until
the party calling on him to take such notice produce
any such document or book of reference."
Section 7938: "The courts will take judicial notice:
Subs. 63. "Of the laws of a sister state, when the
printed or authenticated volumes are presented to the
court for examination."
Subs. 64. "For the purpose of giving credit to judi-
cial proceedings in another state, courts take notice
ex officio of the local laws of the state from which
they come, and when the judgment of the court in a
sister state is impleaded, cognizance of the law of
such a state is taken."
Tennessee Tenn. Ann. Code (Thompson's Shannon) § 5586:
"And it shall not be necessary, in a case carried from
an inferior to a superior court, to have the statutes of
a sister state read as evidence in the inferior court,
transcribed into the record, except where it is directed
to be done by the inferior court; but the superior
court may take judicial notice of such laws and stat-
utes, and decide upon them accordingly."
Virginia Va. Gen. Laws (1923) § 6194a: "Whenever in any
case it becomes necessary to ascertain what the law,
statutory or otherwise, of another state or country,
or of the United States is or was at any time, the
court, judge or other judicial officer or tribunal shall
take notice of and may consult any book of recognized
authority purporting to contain, state or explain the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
West Virginia
same, and may consider any testimony, information or
argument that is offered on the subject."
W. Va. Code Ann. (Warth, 1899) c. 13, § 4: "When-
ever in any case it becomes material to ascertain what
the law, statutory or other, of another state or coun-
try, or of the United States is, or was at any time, the
court, judge, or magistrate shall take judicial notice
thereof, and may consult any printed book, purport-
ing to contain, state or explain the same and consider
any testimony, information or argument that is of-
fered on the subject."
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. (1921) § 4135m: "The courts of this
state shall take judicial notice of the public laws of
any state or territory of the United States."
